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Beyond Barthes
Rethinking the phenomenology 
of photography
andrew Fisher
This article attempts to outline a phenomenology of 
photography, oriented by the situation of photography 
in contemporary media culture. Various recent photo-
graphic art practices have come to emphasize what 
may be seen as specifically phenomenological issues of 
appearance, perception and form. The widespread use 
of photography to address questions of cultural identity 
has tended to appropriate existing images and genres 
of imaging practice in ways that compound embodied 
appearances with their cultural and technical medi-
ation, and to play on the phenomena displacements thus 
produced. Cindy Sherman’s work is paradigmatic here.1 
Other artists have exploited photography’s propensity to 
archival organization and explored the temporal experi-
ence characteristic of photographic series extending 
across different forms of display, organized to mediate 
specific documentary information by establishing per-
ceptual patterns and generic visual connections. Bernd 
and Hilla Becher are canonical figures in this regard.2 
Similarly, one could note the significant and continuing 
transformation of the scale of photographic artworks. 
Jeff Wall’s lightboxes are exemplary for their adop-
tion of the scale of both modern painting and street 
advertising to construct narrative images perceptually 
underpinned by their luminescence and their scalar 
relation to the viewer.3 
An implicit demand for phenomenological analysis 
can also be discerned in the ways in which estab-
lished discourses and practices of photography have 
been challenged by consecutive waves of new digital 
imaging technologies and the invention and consolida-
tion of the Internet. This may sound like a surpris-
ing claim, since theoretical attempts to understand 
these innovations tend to conceive of the experiences 
they engender in anti-phenomenological terms – for 
example, contrasting the kinds of perception proper 
to photography to the technical and cultural novelty 
of new media, in order to theorize the unprecedented 
relationships they seem to establish between body 
and image.4 In this context, great emphasis has been 
placed on the forms of spatio-temporality taken by 
new imaging technologies, such as their propensity to 
instant global dissemination and simultaneous viewing, 
and the ways in which experience of images under 
these conditions is haunted by doubts arising from 
the mutability of digital information. However, in 
broad terms this is also a familiar situation, resonat-
ing with wave upon wave of similar claims made for 
previous technological innovations (including photog-
raphy) and the promises they held out. And this logic 
of supersession threatens, as much as it promises, 
understanding of these relationships between body and 
image. Phenomenology still has much to offer here. 
But this can only be demonstrated by responding to 
the profound objections to phenomenology within the 
theory of photography today.
Photography’s appearances
If phenomenology understands itself broadly as the 
science of appearances, what would a phenomenology 
of photography be? Obviously, it would have to analyse 
the manner in which photography ‘appears’. But it is 
hard to say what photography is on the basis of looking 
at any particular photographic image, machine, process 
or practice. 
An obvious starting point would be to pay detailed 
attention to individual photographs. This would place 
an enormous critical weight on one’s decision regard-
ing which images to look at, since, if the point of 
such analysis is to extrapolate general insights about 
photography from attention to specific photographs, 
the privilege granted any one image would appear 
arbitrary. The value of singular analysis would be won 
at the cost of excluding an effectively infinite field of 
other images. This problem might provoke an alterna-
tive approach: to consider the ways in which different 
arrays of photographic equipment structure experience 
by defining the possibilities of image production. One 
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might consider, for instance, the ‘domestic’ Polaroid 
and the daguerreotype; forms marked by signifi-
cant similarities and differences deriving from their 
material characteristics. Viewing an old daguerreotype 
means looking at a small – originally highly polished, 
but possibly now damaged – reflective surface of a 
unique and historically precious image-object, factors 
that act as phenomenological conditions for what 
one might know or surmise regarding the extended 
exposure time over which the image was made. How 
do these considerations inform the similarities that 
the daguerreotype bears to the small, hand-held and 
unique form of the Polaroid, especially in light of the 
marked differences that emerge when one recalls con-
ventional ideas of the Polaroid’s instantaneity, its rich 
colour and densely layered opacity as these combine 
to characterize understanding of its usage? How might 
one account, phenomenologically, for the historical 
and social conditions that emerge through analysis 
of such forms? Given the problems encountered here, 
one might change tack again and explore the phe-
nomenology of photography by projecting a notion of 
photographic experience as such. But what purchase 
would such an expansive, arguably too formal, notion 
of photographic experience in general have on the spe-
cific material characteristics of different photographic 
practices and on disputes regarding their cultural and 
historical significance?
These various questions and obstacles have pro-
duced a considerable quantity of criticism directed 
towards phenomenological approaches over the last 
forty years. No doubt for many this criticism makes the 
idea of reviving either problematic or banal. Yet, I want 
argue that a phenomenology of photography does in 
fact persist in the field of photographic theory, albeit in 
an obscured and highly eccentric form. One can clarify 
what is stake here by recalling that radical – Marxist, 
feminist, semiotic and psychoanalytical – theorizations 
of photography in the 1970s constituted themselves in 
rejection of the connoisseurial and politically suspect 
discourses of perception and sentiment quite rightly 
taken to inform many discussions of visual art and 
photography at the time.5 It was on this basis that 
phenomenology was ruled out for most interesting 
theorizations of photography in the later twentieth 
century. This shift proved so influential that, looking 
back, one can find virtually no substantial theoretical 
text that explicitly addresses photography in formal 
phenomenological terms.6 
Yet, in pausing to consider such a lack, there is at 
least one striking exception that may come to mind: 
Roland Barthes’s Camera Lucida: Reflections on Pho-
tography.7 Readers of Camera Lucida can be divided 
according to whether they take its phenomenological 
aspect to be problematic or not. For instance, many 
have accepted Barthes’s phenomenology at face value, 
often because it is loose enough to facilitate co-option 
to some other set of interests.8 Others have taken the 
view that Barthes’s first-person narrative compromises 
his wider theoretical claims and that this exhausts what 
phenomenology might have to say about photography.9 
More recently, Camera Lucida’s phenomenology of 
photography has been accepted, but only to argue that 
both phenomenology and photography are historically 
obsolete.10 What should be noted here is that these 
apparently very different readings share key assump-
tions: not only do they take Camera Lucida to define 
correctly the relation between phenomenology and 
photography, but they also accept its basic conception 
of phenomenology, even where they reject it. One aim 
of this article is to expose the precise character of these 
assumptions and to outline an alternative. 
Camera Lucida’s phenomenology aims to grasp 
the essence of photography. More specifically, it is 
an ‘eidetic’ phenomenology – something routinely 
underappreciated in the reception of Barthes. For the 
moment it suffices to note that the concept of ‘eidos’ 
comes to mean pure essence in Husserl’s later phenom-
enology and that eidetic phenomenology is conceived 
as the universal science of transcendental appearances. 
The crucial point here is that Barthes effectively 
collapses phenomenology into Husserl’s eidetic phe-
nomenology, ignoring alternative forms, principally 
Heidegger’s influential development of an existential 
phenomenology. The decisive task in reading Camera 
Lucida as a phenomenology is thus to characterize 
and critically evaluate its eidetic character, and to 
delimit this from other possibilities of phenomeno-
logical analysis. The accumulated disputes over the 
phenomenological character of Camera Lucida have 
not pursued this task. Camera Lucida therefore con-
tains the phenomenology of photography today, in the 
sense of enabling it to persist within the hostile terrain 
of contemporary photography theory, while constrict-
ing what such a phenomenology might be. Its critique 
must therefore be my point of departure.
Of course, if one steps back from the discursive 
sphere of photography theory, eidetic phenomenology 
has been the subject of intense critiques from the 
tradition of existential phenomenology, from Heidegger 
through to Merleau-Ponty. But this tradition has not 
produced a phenomenology of photography, except 
perhaps in a deeply negative or marginal way. Despite 
photography’s dominance as a cultural form through-
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out the twentieth century, existential phenomenology 
has tended summarily to reject it, ignore it, or reduce 
it to the umbrella of a wider critique of modern tech-
nology.11 We therefore have little to start out with 
from here. Barthes’s phenomenology is eccentric to 
this tradition and it appears a very minor contribu-
tion to it, but it does at least offer a serious engaged 
phenomenology of photography. There is another, more 
complex and ironic, value in Camera Lucida: there 
are in fact powerful existential aspects to Barthes’s 
phenomenology itself. Barthes’s deployment of eidetic 
phenomenology harbours its self-criticism, and, out 
of this, generates rich existential insights into the 
way photography appears for us within media-satu-
rated cultures. But Barthes does not develop this phe-
nomenology other than negatively. This shows in the 
inadequacies of his account of photography, whether 
this concerns its socio-historical or its technical form. 
My aim in this article is thus to extract Barthes’s 
negative phenomenology of photography and thereby 
prepare the ground for its positive elaboration.
rereading Camera Lucida
The focus of Camera Lucida is on the forms of 
generality and specificity that Barthes takes to shape 
experience of photography. His account hinges on 
an absolutely specific idea of photography’s essence, 
defined by an entirely formal notion of photographic 
time and articulated in terms of an extremely singular 
form of experience. The first part of the inquiry asks: 
‘Why mightn’t there be, somehow, a new science for 
each object? A mathesis singularis (and no longer 
universalis)?’12 In response, Barthes projects a ‘science 
of the singular’, oriented by his insistence that emotion 
should lead reflection, heuristically, ‘from photograph 
to photograph’ in order to account for the specific 
manner in which photography mediates desire.13 In a 
notoriously unargued move, photography is defined by 
the supposed necessity with which it makes reference 
to a unique event that had to have unfolded before the 
camera for an image to be produced.14 Here, it is the 
chemical and mechanical nature of the negative-based 
photographic apparatus that guarantees the eviden-
tiary character of photographic images. The ostensive 
function of such photographs (the way they are often 
assumed to point towards something else and to efface 
themselves in the process) is central to the represen-
tational operations put in question: ‘the Photograph 
is never anything but an antiphon of “Look”, “See”, 
“Here it is”.’15 It is on these bases that Barthes derives 
his widely celebrated concepts of the studium and 
punctum, which respectively signify the broad field of 
culture shaped by generalized forms of intentionality 
and the kind of emotional event that might irrupt from 
this sphere, punctuating and puncturing it with affective 
value.16 Famously, the punctum is first thought in terms 
of the multiple details registered by photographs. Their 
proliferation is taken to be a function of the camera 
and not the photographer (that is, an excess of detail 
enters into the photograph despite, and not because of, 
the manifest intentions of its producer). The form of 
desiring specificity aimed at through the punctum is 
impersonal and machinic, and stands in opposition to 
what Barthes thinks of as the overdetermined form of 
photographic culture.17 
In Camera Lucida’s second part Barthes presents 
an account of photographic time conceived in terms of 
loss and remembrance.18 In general, here, photographic 
time is taken to be exemplary of the period of writing, 
in both a personal and a historical sense. Indeed, the 
categories ‘personal’ and ‘historical’ are collapsed 
into one another as a phenomenological problem, and 
it is in this light that time comes to be seen as the 
essence of photography: ‘there exists another punctum 
… than the “detail”. This new punctum, which is no 
longer of form but of intensity, is Time, the lacerating 
emphasis of the noeme (“that-has-been”), its pure 
representation.’19 Among other contrasts, the move-
ment characteristic of film is opposed to photographic 
stillness to define photography as an image form that 
interrupts historical time (‘motionless, the Photograph 
flows backwards from presentation to retention’) and 
underwrites conceptualization of an ‘ecstatic’ encoun-
ter with the past.20 Photographic time (the presentation 
of pastness) and space (the basically spatial form of 
ostension) are thus radicalized and sutured together in 
a transcendental framework that is explicitly Husser-
lian. Pathos, then, becomes the conceptual core of the 
gesture towards theorizing the ecstasy of photography, 
with which the book ends.
Mad or tame? Photography can be one or the other: 
tame if its realism remains relative, tempered by aes-
thetic or empirical habits (to leaf through a magazine 
at the hairdresser’s, the dentist’s); mad if this realism is 
absolute and, so to speak, original, obliging the loving 
and terrified consciousness to return to the very letter 
of Time: a strictly revulsive movement which reverses 
the course of the thing, and which I shall call the 
photographic ecstasy.21
The fate of experience in modernity is thus concep-
tualized according to the ‘impossible-possibility’ of a 
live encounter with the dead, and this is generalized 
as an ecstatic specificity that temporalizes significant 
experience in a world full of photographs. 
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The concepts developed in Camera Lucida continue 
to be widely used. Barthes’s association of the photo-
graph’s ‘freezing’ action with death, and his conclusion 
that still photography is exhausted by pastness, espe-
cially, have been diagnosed as sponsoring a widespread 
and problematic ‘rhetoric of immobilization’.22 Another 
commentator has recently described the tendency to 
accept at face value Barthes’s radicalization of photo-
graphic indexicality as dwelling in ‘the shadow of 
the cloying melancholia of a post-Barthesian era of 
photographic theory’.23 Yet, however much one might 
agree with these criticisms, they should not be taken 
to mean that any phenomenological theorization of 
photography would necessarily suffer the same fate. 
Nonetheless, justification of this claim necessitates a 
more specific account of Barthes’s phenomenology of 
photography itself.
orthodoxy, method, fiction 
The clue to this task is to be found in the fictionalizing 
use to which Barthes puts formal phenomenological 
method, and his claim that it is overdetermined by 
phenomenology’s historical status as orthodoxy. The 
analysis of how orthodox phenomenological method 
is appropriated here should begin by considering the 
manner in which Barthes reveals his own heuristic 
approach in relation to it. The strategy is outlined in 
a passage that informs the rest of the inquiry, so it is 
worth quoting at length:
In this investigation of Photography, I borrowed 
something from phenomenology’s project, and 
something from its language. But it was a vague, 
casual, even cynical phenomenology…. First of all, 
I did not escape, or try to escape, from a paradox: 
on the one hand the desire to give a name to Pho-
tography’s essence and then to sketch an eidetic 
science of the Photograph; and on the other the 
intractable feeling that Photography is essentially 
… only contingency, singularity, risk.… [I]s it not 
the very weakness of Photography, this difficulty in 
existing which we call banality? Next, my phenom-
enology agreed to compromise with a power, affect; 
affect was what I didn’t want to reduce; being irre-
ducible, it was thereby what I wanted, what I ought 
to reduce the Photograph to; but could I retain an 
affective intentionality, a view of the object which 
was immediately steeped in desire, repulsion, 
nostalgia, euphoria? Classical phenomenology … 
had never, so far as I could remember, spoken of 
desire or mourning. Of course I could make out in 
Photography, in a very orthodox manner, a whole 
network of essences: material essences (neces-
sitating the physical, chemical, optical study of 
Photography), and regional essences (deriving, for 
instance, from aesthetics, from History, from soci-
ology); but at the moment of reaching the essence 
of Photography in general, I branched off; instead 
of following the path of a formal ontology (of a 
Logic), I stopped, keeping with me, like a treasure, 
my desire or my grief; the anticipated essence of 
the Photograph could not, in my mind, be separated 
from the ‘pathos’ of which, from the first glance, it 
consists.24
This passage has received much commentary, mainly 
concerning its emphasis on desire and contingency. 
What has been neglected is the way it approaches these 
themes by characterizing phenomenology, historically, 
as a scholastic orthodoxy, and, conceptually, as a clas-
sicizing methodology.25 Barthes asserts that the object 
of phenomenology – what is to be revealed by the trans-
cendental science of immediate experience – and the 
failures of its orthodox form – its supposed avoidance 
of affect and the formal logic taken to encourage this 
oversight – suggest a way to conceptualize the paradox 
he places at the core of photography: the contingent 
form of its universal essence. He reads phenomenology 
(an explicit mathesis universalis) symptomatically, as a 
form of writing that has failed in the face of affect, and 
this shapes his mathesis singularis of the photograph. 
The generalization of this diagnosis is both casual and 
sophisticated. One can summarize it in the following 
manner. In Camera Lucida, phenomenology is set up 
as a fiction, an analogon of reified social experience, 
and the ‘breaking down’ of phenomenology in the 
face of affect parallels and facilitates articulation 
of the ‘breaking out’ of authentic significance from 
banalized social reality. As such, it also fictionalizes 
the key concern of phenomenology, namely immediate 
experience. This diagnosis prepares phenomenology’s 
appropriation as a ‘literary’ form and it provides the 
framework for Barthes’s eidetic phenomenology of 
photography.
Of all the novelistic or literary motifs in Camera 
Lucida, its phenomenological fiction is the least exam-
ined and most central. If one were to take the advice 
given by Victor Burgin and read Camera Lucida as a 
‘fiction’, which remains a good suggestion, it would 
appear most fruitful to do so in terms of the way 
it deals with phenomenology.26 In his comment that 
Camera Lucida is ‘novelistic’, Burgin tries to make 
sense of its deployment of phenomenology ‘in tandem’ 
with psychoanalysis. He sees this as a basic contra-
diction, because of the way in which phenomenology 
‘rejects the notion of the unconscious’, but here he is 
swayed by those points at which Barthes misleadingly 
identifies phenomenology with Sartre.27 The impor-
tant position of psychoanalysis in cultural criticism 
23
makes such stringent denials of the unconscious appear 
suspect, and Burgin’s response that it would be a shame 
to deny the analytic gains made by psychoanalysis is 
compelling. Nonetheless, it is worth dwelling on the 
fact that Burgin takes this to necessitate a denial of 
phenomenology, as this elides the way that Barthes 
distances his own inquiry from psychoanalysis. In 
any case, such a response does not address the way 
in which Barthes explicitly locates his account of 
photography on the problematized territory of formal 
phenomenology. This can be clarified further through 
analysis of Barthes’s appropriation of Sartrean and 
Husserlian concepts and procedures.
For sartre
The fact that Camera Lucida is dedicated to Sartre’s 
The Imaginary (1940) is significant, as many of Bar-
thes’s concepts are derived from this book.28 It appears 
odd, however, given that Barthes’s earlier work had 
played a significant part in intellectual developments 
taken to render Sartre’s ideas obsolete, or at least 
distinctly unfashionable. What needs to be appreciated 
is both the centrality of Sartrean themes and concepts 
to Camera Lucida and the manner in which they are 
turned to distinctly un-Sartrean ends.
There are many points at which The Imaginary 
informs Camera Lucida. For instance, the introduc-
tion of the punctum is prepared with reference to 
Barthes’s description of being bored in the face of 
many newspaper photographs.29 Barthes borrows the 
term ‘analogon’ from Sartre’s discussion of the image 
as ‘an equivalent of perception’ that one ‘animates’ in 
imaginary relation to something.30 Sartre’s continual 
play on metaphors of ‘adherence’ and ‘stickiness’, and 
his account of the forms of ‘emanation’ that charac-
terize images for desiring consciousness, are central 
to the rhetorical construction of Barthes’s notion of 
photographic reference.31 The ultimately magical and 
melancholy character of such reference for Barthes is 
also close to Sartre’s notion of imagination: ‘The act 
of imagination … is a magical art. It is an incantation 
destined to make the object of one’s thought, the thing 
one desires, appear in such a way that one can take 
possession of it. There is always, in that act, something 
of the imperious and the infantile, a refusal to take 
account of distance and difficulties.’32
Sartre develops a phenomenological psychology in 
The Imaginary oriented by the question, ‘what are the 
characteristics that can be attributed to consciousness 
on the basis of the fact that it is consciousness capable 
of imaging?’33 Imagination, perception and cognition 
are conceived as fundamental ‘attitudes’ of conscious-
ness, defined by the different ways they bring things 
to light. But imagination presents a problem as it does 
not, in principle, depend upon the forms of presence 
and apodicticity that Sartre sees as definitive of percep-
tion and cognition. It is characterized according to its 
‘irrealizing’ function, as in his prefatory note: ‘This 
work aims to describe the great “irrealising” function 
of consciousness, or “imagination”, and its noematic 
correlate, the imaginary.’34 On this model, the object 
imaged is an ‘irreality’ in so far as it entails evocation 
of something not present or conceptually generalizable, 
yet that is, crucially, still concrete. The irrealizing 
function of imagination is worthy of attention because 
it entails the denial of the perceptual and cognitive 
form of the presence and meaning of things, whilst 
affirming being-in-the-world. One’s conscious experi-
ence can be modulated to focus on that which is distant 
or unreal, in the past or future, but to take up such 
possibilities imaginatively is only to modulate one’s 
experience in relation to the environment against which 
they stand out to be enacted. Decisively, imaging 
consciousness gives an object but at the price of only 
including what one puts into it: ‘the object of an image 
is never anything more than the consciousness one has 
of it.’35 Sartre takes this to mark out the imagination 
as being the most distinctively intentional and thus, 
for his phenomenological approach, the most defining 
mode of consciousness.
Camera Lucida is indebted to Sartre in these terms 
but an important difference remains. Barthes insists 
that photography is an absolutely historically distinct 
and epoch-making form of image. However, this very 
difference also facilitates his appropriation of Sar-
tre’s concepts and language: ‘Photography’s referent 
is not the same as the referent of other systems of 
representation.… It’s not optionally real; it’s necessar-
ily real … Every photograph is somehow co-natural 
with its referent.’36 This takes historical form: ‘Every 
photograph is a certificate of presence. This is the new 
embarrassment, which its invention has introduced into 
the family of images.’37 The cultural dominance of 
photography is read out of this relation and is alluded 
to as a context in which ‘I see photographs everywhere, 
like everyone else, nowadays; they come from the 
world to me, without my asking.’38 On Sartre’s model, 
elaboration of differences between forms of representa-
tion is secondary to articulation of the different modes 
of world disclosure granted by the fundamental atti-
tudes of consciousness. Barthes’s emphatic conception 
of the ontological significance of photography commits 
him to the idea that its historical innovation served 
to interrupt intentional consciousness, as such, and to 
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transform it. Sartre’s notion of the imaginary is turned 
into a description of the colonization of consciousness 
by photography. His emphatic notion of intentionality 
(the always situated consciousness-of-something that 
finds itself thrust out into a worldly relation with 
things) is carried over into Camera Lucida, but only 
to the extent that it describes cultural operations that 
instrumentally prefigure imaginative possibility.
The critical balance rests on what Barthes takes 
photography’s status to mean. This can be seen most 
clearly in his celebrated assertion regarding the essence 
of photographic time: that the photograph is character-
ized as certifying no more and no less than ‘That-has-
been’.39 Experience of this takes the following form: 
One might say that the Photograph separates atten-
tion from perception, and yields up only the former, 
even if it is impossible without the latter; that this 
is an aberrant thing, noesis without noeme, an 
action of thought without thought, an aim without a 
target.40 
The concepts noesis and noema describe a cor-
relation that is structuring of intentional conscious-
ness for Husserl. The active character of intentional 
consciousness-of-something can be considered from 
the perspective of its being directed (noesis) as well as 
from the point of view of that to which it is directed 
(noema). The pairing was conceived by Husserl to 
overcome the problematic form of separation pertain-
ing between the notions of subject and object. Perhaps 
this striking formulation most clearly characterizes 
what I have identified as Barthes’s fictional treatment 
of phenomenology. It is undoubtedly informed by 
Sartre, yet would be strictly impossible on his terms, 
in which the situated character of even the most 
imaginatively attenuated experience is always already 
structured by precisely this correlation of noesis and 
noeme. In Barthes’s version, the noematic correlate 
of the image, the imaginary, is cut loose from its 
existential moorings. In this light, one can note that 
the novel temporality of the photograph outlined in 
Barthes’s earlier essay ‘The Rhetoric of the Image’ is 
articulated in terms of a specifically spatio-
temporal paradox: ‘What we have is a new 
space–time category: spatial immediacy 
and temporal anteriority, the photograph 
being an illogical conjunction between the 
here-now and the there-then’.41 Divorced 
of its spatial aspect, this paradox is made 
emphatic in Camera Lucida. In the earlier 
text the photograph ‘is never experienced 
as an illusion’, it is ‘in no way a presence’ 
and elaboration of its temporal paradox is 
followed by the warning: ‘claims as to the 
magical character of the photographic image 
must be deflated’.42 
Camera Lucida examines this illogi-
cal coincidence as offering an absolutely 
intimate experience of the past, thus: ‘In 
Photography, the presence of the thing is 
never metaphoric … the corpse is alive, 
as corpse: it is the living image of a dead 
thing.’43 Barthes’s account of this relation 
is intrinsically melancholic; the presence of 
what is gone is won at the expense of its having passed 
from the live realm of carnality into the metaphysically 
nebulous sphere of mechanically and chemically regis-
tered light in photographic emulsion (though Barthes 
reportedly used newspaper supplements as a major 
source, so this last term should really read ‘ink on 
paper’). But the photograph does not just evoke the 
dead; it gives one the experience of the dead as speci-
fied in a way that only the living can be. There are two, 
co-dependent, members of the ‘living dead’ at work in 
this magical relation. It describes a form of animation 
of the lost other, but only through a desire on the part 
of the living for some kind of redemption from their 
habituation to the deathly form of their otherness to 
themselves. Figuring photography’s form of reference 
as a radicalized certificate of presence produces an 
imaginary relation that bears the distinctive marks 
of Sartrean intentionality, but in dismembered form. 








characteristic of Sartre’s notion of consciousness, but 
refigures this paradoxically as a kind of personification 
of desire emerging from an overdetermined culture of 
photographic mediation. This is a move that reserves 
and purifies a moment of transfigured and intention-
less affect, somehow redirected and ‘returned’ to the 
subject by the photograph as an ‘aim without a target’. 
Thus it is that the ‘anti-intentional’ character of Bar-
thes’s account of photographic culture is radicalized 
and his dissatisfaction with the conventional engi-
neering of the viewer’s response to images turns out 
to be a categorical feature of photography’s essence. 
This marks Barthes’s move to a transcendental rather 
than existential account of the experience of photo-
graphic experience. Sartre’s psychology is thereby 
exceeded, but in a direction that would be ruled out 
by his distinctive privileging of existence over essence. 
The transcendental notion of photographic time that 
Barthes tries to make sense of here is facilitated by a 
further appropriation – this time from Husserl’s eidetic 
reduction.
the ecstasy of Husserl’s reduction 
One should recall that ‘eidos’ is the central term in 
Husserl’s later transcendental phenomenology, in which 
essences are the universal and rule-giving norms for 
empirical experience of objects, meanings and facts.44 
The desire of eidetic phenomenology is to bring univer-
sal essence to cognition, and, in light of this, one must 
also recall that Barthes’s inquiry is oriented by the 
assertion that the eidos of the photograph is rooted in 
its contingency. In order to explore what this means it is 
necessary to rehearse key moments of Husserl’s eidetic 
reduction. Husserl approaches the thinking of essence 
through the methodological procedure of ‘epoché’ or 
‘reduction’. This controversial form of reflection took 
different shapes in the development of his thought. 
Generally, however, it is intended as a reflective setting 
aside of one’s concerns regarding the actuality of 
engagements with objects and practices and the ways 
that these structure and inform one’s life in the world; 
the idea being that such an act of wilful imaginative 
suspension could facilitate intellectual access to the 
essential characteristics of experience. This procedural 
aspect of the eidetic reduction structures Barthes’s 
report on his own reflective procedure.
The eidetic reduction is supposed to strip away the 
contingent factors of experience: ‘The universal which 
first comes to prominence in the empirically given 
must from the outset be freed from its character of 
contingency.’45 An important stage in this is ‘imagina-
tive variation’, which entails thinking of something in 
such a way as to turn it into an arbitrary example. An 
exemplary thing is considered, in Husserl’s words, as 
‘a point of departure for the production of an infinitely 
open multiplicity of variants’.46 The idea is that one 
attempts to think of imaginative variations through 
which such an exemplar could be considered, whilst 
still remaining intuitable as a thing of its kind. It is 
important that the entire set of imaginative variants 
thus produced remain ‘immediately intuitable’; that 
is, that one can imagine them all at once and as a 
set, yet without concern for their actual existence. For 
Husserl, if one were to attempt to think an infinitely 
varied list of actual variants, the resulting image or 
intuition upon which one might settle would not rest on 
an imaginatively projected generic characteristic. One 
would merely perform ‘the inventive imagining of a 
thing or a figure, changing into arbitrarily new figures’, 
the upshot being that one would only ever encounter 
‘something always new, and always only one thing: 
the last-imagined’.47 In contrast, imaginative variation 
is supposed to produce the intuition of variations that 
exhibit a ‘unity that runs through this multiplicity of 
successive figures’ and to reveal the general essence 
of the thing to imagination: ‘In such free variations 
… an Invariant is necessarily retained as the neces-
sary general form. … [T]his form stands out in the 
practice of voluntary variation, and as an absolutely 
identical content, an invariable what, according to 
which all the variants coincide: a general essence.’48 
The process of imaginatively producing intuition of 
such a general invariant suggests how one might think 
universal essence: ‘This general essence is the eidos, 
the idea in the Platonic sense, but apprehended in its 
purity and free from all metaphysical interpretations, 
therefore taken exactly as it is given to us immediately 
and intuitively in the vision of the idea which arises 
in this way.’49 The idea is supposed to emerge sui 
generis, and yet be conceptualizable, guaranteed by 
the way imaginative variation remains in touch with 
and does not add anything to the relation between the 
object reflected and the agent of its reflection. Having 
sketched the framework of this procedure, it is possible 
to set aside more detailed consideration of the eidetic 
reduction as the outline given describes its appropria-
tion by Barthes.
Throughout Camera Lucida Barthes describes 
encounters with images according to his way of pas-
sively leafing through books and magazines, looking 
at the images in them one at a time, only stopping 
to reflect upon those that strike him as significant: 
‘I was glancing through an illustrated magazine. A 
photograph made me pause.’50 This is the basis of 
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the choices he exercises and it is dependent upon 
the material flow of a potentially infinite number of 
actual images. His manner of procuring for himself a 
reflective situation in which his ‘attention’ is readied 
for separation from his ‘perception’ in the form of a 
‘noesis without noeme’51 appears fatefully, however, 
to be delimited by Husserl’s warning against per-
forming the merely ‘inventive imagining of a thing 
or a figure, changing into arbitrarily new figures’.52 
One can articulate Barthes’s repeated descriptions of 
the particular situations in which he reports seeing 
photographs – leafing in an acedic manner through 
colour supplements, for example – as a quasi-corporeal 
variation on the reflective procedure of imaginative 
variation. That this is oriented to (and claimed to 
have succeeded in producing) the occasional, punctur-
ing irruption of photographic essence, renders this a 
highly eccentric appropriation of the method of eidetic 
reduction. Surely this is to give over to some external 
form of agency the very ability to set out on this 
reflective performance? This is the explicit purpose 
of Barthes’s eidetic reduction, but in the form of the 
paradoxically subjective ecstasy of cultural media-
tion. No consideration is given to the conceptual and 
material resistances that the social character of this 
inherently inter-subjective mode of reflection might 
face. These fall, so to speak, into the gap between 
Barthes’s encounter with photographs and his report on 
the results. This gap is the textual space in which he 
articulates the transcendental radicalization of Sartre’s 
existential form of imaginary intentionality. 
But his eidetic purification of photographic affect 
leaves a problematic remainder, or, perhaps, represses a 
question that returns to haunt eidetic phenomenology’s 
reconstruction as a theory of photography. It would 
seem clear, given the characterization of photographic 
culture according to punctum and studium – and the 
way in which these terms are generalized, later in the 
book, according to the pathos-ridden opposition ‘Mad 
or Tame?’ – that Barthes’s own status as the subject 
of reflection is reduced to one half of a performance, 
which must also include the more or less anonymously 
authored movements and processes shaping the forms 
of cultural production he excoriates. This strategy 
incorporates into the reflective structure of Barthes’s 
eidetic fiction a concretely instantiated conception 
of photography as an interminable encounter with 
specific moments of an effectively infinite series. Rep-
etition and reproducibility are thus absolutely central 
to it.53 
What is supposed to signal the appearance of the 
essence of photography is the absolute specificity of 
the affective experiences that only certain images 
provoke. But in order to get to this Barthes seizes 
upon the constantly appearing, constitutively replace-
able, and arbitrarily emergent ‘last-imagined’ and quite 
generic example that the unthematized presence of a 
cultural operator ‘in general’ gives him. The immedi-
ate singularity he seeks is thus, precisely in its most 
poignant and personal instances, socially mediated in 
form. The critical exposition of Barthes’s eidetic phe-
nomenology of photography therefore reveals that the 
contingency of the desire that irrupts from looking at 
photographs turns out to have, so to speak, the wrong 
kind of contingency: it turns out to be intersubjective 
or social. This quality of the ‘last-imagined’ photo-
graph thus stands as a subterranean correlative to the 
singularly significant experience that Barthes desires. 
Here, following the trail of Barthes’s assertions that 
photographs are essentially indexical, and that mass 
culture is inherently banal, returns one to the phenom-
enological fiction they authorize, but in a manner that 
shatters its crystalline eidos of photography.
existential phenomenology
In Camera Lucida the whole idea of a phenomenology 
of photography is contracted into eidetic phenomenol-
ogy. Given Camera Lucida’s pivotal function as a 
placeholder for the phenomenology of photography, 
this contraction occludes consideration of other, non-
eidetic, phenomenological approaches. This is further 
complicated by Camera Lucida’s own remarkable 
contribution to this alternative, which effectively 
turns the transcendental science of eidetic appearance 
into a form of existential cultural critique. It is little 
wonder the reception of Barthes has neglected this. 
But subsequent appropriations of concepts such as the 
punctum, desire, death and photographic temporality 
make the theory of photography hostage to his notion 
of photography’s eidos. Furthermore, it is this aspect 
of Camera Lucida that enables a rethinking of the 
phenomenology of photography today.
The critical issue here hinges on Barthes’s asser-
tion that the categories of radical singularity and 
absolute specificity structure the phenomenology of 
photography. As shown above, it is this commitment 
that renders his eidetic theory of photography problem-
atic. This has a range of implications. It rules out many 
important aspects of photography that strongly suggest 
themselves for critically oriented phenomenological 
analysis. For instance, no detailed consideration is 
given to the materiality of photographs, as is obvious 
from the fact that Barthes’s major source of images is 
colour supplements (a matrix of dots printed on paper), 
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whilst his vocabulary of photography’s technical form 
centres on the phenomenal effects and ontological 
significance of photographic emulsion. It also distorts 
important aspects of his discussion of photography 
as an image form. Barthes in fact derives all of his 
insights about photography from those of its forms that 
rely on negatives, without the specific analysis that this 
commitment would seem to demand – for instance, in 
terms of the negative’s inherent reproducibility.
One of the main conclusions I want to draw from 
these considerations is that, whilst Camera Lucida is 
an emphatically eidetic phenomenology of photography, 
its construction is oriented to an existential analytic, 
which would be better addressed through an explicitly 
existential phenomenology. Barthes’s ‘fictionalizing’ 
of an eidetic account of photography orients him to 
an existential analysis of reified cultural experience, 
but this remains limited, holding at a distance those 
material, historical, technical and cultural questions 
that are not congruent with the focus on singular-
ity and specificity. One can return, here, to the key 
passage in which he outlines the phenomenological 
character of his inquiry (quoted at length above) to 
note that, while Barthes denies a phenomenology 
of material and regional essences – in favour of a 
stress on the pure contingency of affect – he does 
not, as announced, actually ‘branch off’ from the 
‘path of formal ontology’.54 Rather, he surreptitiously 
stays on this path. After setting photography up as 
an existential problem, Barthes remains oriented to 
a transcendental account of emotional experience, 
which assumes too quickly the achievement of societal 
reification over meaningful experience, and which sur-
renders too easily the critical value of specific analysis 
in favour of a self-consciously weak metaphysics of 
specificity.
As already remarked in the introduction, the obvious 
point to make about Barthes’s fixation on Husserl is 
that it can be subjected to the critiques of eidetic 
phenomenology developed by later phenomenologists. 
The pertinent difference between eidetic and existential 
phenomenology can be briefly indicated by reiterating 
the fact that the former’s priority is to conceive the 
ideality of essence – that is, the manner in which 
it stands prior to and independent of the existence 
of particular objects. Broadly speaking, existential 
phenomenology prioritizes the inverse, as in Sartre’s 
famous slogan: ‘existence precedes essence’.55 Sartre 
thus disavows the eidetic reduction, but Merleau-Ponty 
outlines a more ambivalent position. In answer to the 
question, ‘What is phenomenology?’, with which the 
preface to the Phenomenology of Perception begins, 
he writes: ‘Phenomenology is the study of essences.… 
But phenomenology is also a philosophy which puts 
essences back into existence’.56 His further formulation 
resonates with Barthes’s peculiar treatment of the 
reduction. Merleau-Ponty writes: ‘Reflection does not 
withdraw from the world towards the unit of conscious-
ness as the world’s basis … it alone is consciousness 
of the world because it reveals that world as strange 
and paradoxical. … The most important lesson which 
the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a com-
plete reduction.’57 This could stand as an existential 
reformulation of Barthes’s relation to Husserl’s method 
of imaginative variation; most notably in so far as 
Merleau-Ponty maintains the reflective character of 
the reduction, and goes on to articulate its interrup-
tion as a key figure for thinking about embodied and 
situated experience. The reduction fails, but it remains 
significant as a form of thought that thus becomes, so 
to speak, interminable. Merleau-Ponty’s rethinking of 
the phenomenological reduction therefore promises 
much for the rethinking of Camera Lucida. 
Unfortunately, this cannot be said for Merleau-
Ponty’s account of photography, which is patently 
limited and outmoded.58 The tradition of existential 
phenomenology has yet to produce a phenomenology 
of photography worthy of the name. 
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